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LATENT EQUITIES IN MARYLAND
By CHARLES G. PAOE*
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

It has been stated as a general rule that the bona fide
purchase of an equitable interest will not cut off prior
claims or equities. This article is directed to a discussion
of certain exceptions to the rule, at least with regard to
choses in action, and to a discussion of the reasons for
such exceptions.
A typical example of the problem is: Can an assignor
of a chose in action upset his assignment on the ground
of fraud after a subsequent assignment to a bona fide
purchaser without notice ? The discussion will also include
the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall2 which is not generally regarded as within the scope of the latent equity doctrine.
This involves the question: Can a subsequent assignee of
a chose in action overcome the claim of a prior assignee
who has failed to notify the obligor of his assignment?
The Rights of a Bona Fide Purchaser
To bring out the problem more clearly, certain of the
rules applicable to the purchase of a chattel will be summarized. It is fundamental that except in extraordinary
cases a thief cannot give a better title than he possesses.
If a chattel is stolen and pawned, the owner can retake the
* Of the Baltimore City bar. A.B., 1922, Princeton University; LL.B.,
1925, Harvard Law School. Lecturer on Suretyship and Mortgages, University of Maryland School of Law, 1930-1936.
'There are, of course, many possible situations. So, what are the assignee's rights if creditors of the obligor assert the obligation was incurred
in fraud of creditors? If the obligee obtained the obligation fraudulently?
If the assignor assigns in breach of trust, etc.?
13 Russ. 1 (1823).
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chattel without reimbursing the pawnee because the thief
cannot convey a good legal lien or title.'
Despite the fact that the thief who has no title cannot
cut off the legal title of the owner, a different rule prevails where the holder of a legal title subject to an. equity
conveys the title to a bona fide purchaser. Here the bona
fide purchaser of the legal title will postpone the holder
of the equity. The rule is one of inaction: An equity court
will not disturb the legal title.4 So, a trustee can, in breach
of his trust, convey a good title to a bona fide purchaser ;5
a fraudulent vendee of property can convey a good title
(as against his vendor who has an equity of rescission) to
a bona fide purchaser.' The rule has even been extended
to the case where legal title is acquired after notice to support a prior purchase of an equitable interest.7 This is
known as the doctrine of "tabula in naufragio".
When we go one step down the ladder and arrive at
a conflict of equitable interests, a still different rule prevails. As between two equities acquired by two bona fide
purchasers, the first in time will prevail and the rule "qui
prior est tempore, potior est jure" is applied.' Another
way of expressing the same thing was attempted by Lord
Westbury in Phillips v. Phillips' and is that "every conveyance of an equitable interest is an innocent conveyance".' ° Or it has been stated that a bona fide purchase
of an equitable interest will not cut off prior equities. 1
3Md. Code, Art. 83, See. 44 (Uniform Sales Act), Lemp Brewing Co. v.
Mantz, 120 Md. 176, 181 (1913).
' Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 311, 62 L. Ed. 309, 38 S. Ct.
99 (1917) ; Huston, The Enforcement of Equitable Decrees, 131; Maitland,
Lectures on Equity, 123, 143. It is interesting to note that at one time even
a purchaser with notice of the legal title prevailed; contra since Phillips v.
Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J. 208 (1861) ; Huston, op. cit. supra, 129.
5Maitland, op. cit. supra note 4, 122, 129, 130.
6 Md. Code, Art. 83, Sec. 45 (Uniform Sales Act).
I Huston, op. cit. supra note 4, 129; Ames, Purchase for Value without
Notice (1887) 1 Har. L. R. 1, 14; Maitland, op. cit. supra note 4, 135. Cf.
Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 303, 311 (merely gives lien) ; 4 Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees, Sec. 886.
8 Maitland, op. cit. supra note 4, 130, 131; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
4th Ed., Sec. 414.
' 4 De G. F. & J. 208 (1861).
10Glenn, Assignment of Choses in Action; Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser
(1934) 20 Va. L. R. 621, 625.
" Merchants Bank v. People's Assn., 70 F. (2d) 169 (1934); 4 Bogert,
op. cit. supra note 7, sec. 885; Huston, op. cit. supra note 4, 116, 180.
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Unless the holder of the first equity is guilty of some unwarranted misrepresentation which would create an estoppel, the ordinary rule is that he will prevail. So, if
C, a cestui que trust, assigns his interest to A, A takes the
interest subject to all equities then existing; if T, trustee
of an equity of redemption for C, assigns it to a bona fide
purchaser in fraud of C, C will prevail;12 if a fraudulent
vendee makes an equitable mortgage of his interest to A,
a bona fide purchaser, the defrauded vendor can rescind
the sale and re-acquire the property.'"
Despite these recognized rules there has been a constant pressure to facilitate commerce in such interests. In
1887 Professor James Barr Ames advanced the theory that:
"A court of equity will not deprive a defendant
of any right of property, whether legal or equitable,
for which he has given value without notice of the
plaintiff's equity, nor of any other common law right
acquired as an incident of his purchase."14
The theory was designed to put the bona fide purchaser
of an equitable "ownership" in the same position occupied by the bona fide purchaser of a legal title with respect
to prior equities. Ames' theory has not been acceptedat least with regard to chattels; though as we shall see, he
is not very far from present authority with regard to
choses in action. 15
op. cit. supra note 4, 118; Maitland, op. cit. supra note 4, 131.
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, See. 885, pp. 2564, 2565. Cf. the doctrine
of equitable restrictions on land under Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774 (1848).
Huston, op. cit. supra note 4, 109.
Ames, op. cit. supra note 7, 1, 3.
The question of the rights of a purchaser of an equity involves the
interesting discussion whether the rights of the owner of an equitable
interest are merely against the trustee and his privies (in personam) or in
the thing itself and so good until cut off by purchase of legal title; or, is
the right a mere claim or an "equitable ownership"? For development of
the law on this subject see Huston, op. cit. supra note 4, 87; W. W. Cook,
'2Huston,

134

The Power of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Col. L. R. 37, 106; H. F. Stone,
The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 Col. L. R.
467; Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17

Col. L. Rev. 467. The Supreme Court has repudiated Mr. Justice Stone's
view, at least with respect to taxation, in Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422,
79 L. Ed. 1520, 55 S. Ct. 800 (1935).
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Negotiable Choses
Turning now to choses in action, it is a commonly stated
rulo that the assignor cannot assign legal title to a chose;
and that the assignee merely obtains an equitable interest
with a power to sue in the name of the assignor. Proverbially, the assignee "stands in the shoes" of the assignor.16
Of course, this rule has also felt the pressure of modern day customs and the demand to facilitate commerce.
The most common examples of the change in the common
law is the rule concerning negotiability of certain instruments containing obligations to pay money or deliver goods,
as for instance, negotiable bills and notes, stock certificates, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, etc. These, by
the law merchant and by statute have been treated as
things, so that the right to enforce the chose passes with
the title to the certificate. Unlike ordinary choses, the
promise is to the payee or order, to the world at large, and
a direct legal right to enforce the chose is obtained by
the purchaser. Defenses of the obligor of failure of consideration, fraud, etc. cannot be set up. Also the pressure
has been sufficiently great to change the common law rule
even with regard to passage of legal title by a thief so
that a chose represented by a negotiable instrmnent is
transferable by a thief where an ordinary chattel cannot
be so transferred.
The law concerning these is still in a state of change
and we see the most recent attempt to give this characteristic of negotiability to corporate bonds which do not come
within the Negotiable Instruments Law. Some courts have
succeeded in giving such bonds the characteristic of negotiability without the aid of statute, some have required a
statute.'
With these special choses in action we are not concerned
and we return to the ordinary chose in action which on
the one side is not so personal that the obligation cannot
II Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) Sec. 432.
R. T. Steffen & H. E. Russell, The Negotiabilit of Corporate Bonds
(1932) 41 Yale L. J. 799; See also (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 539; Thayer,
Marine Insurance Oertiflcate8 (1935) 49 Har. L. R. 239.
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be assigned; on the other side, is not within the exception
concerning negotiable instruments.1 8
The Nature of the Assignment of an Ordinary Chose
At common law "legal title" to a chose cannot be assigned. Blackstone says:"9
"Which property (a chose in action) is however
not in possession but in action merely and recoverable
by suit at law; wherefore it could not be transferred
to another person by the strict rules of the ancient
common law, for no chose in action could be granted
over because it was thought to be a great encouragement to litigiousness if a man were allowed to make
over to a stranger his right of going to law. But this
nicety is now disregarded; though in compliance with
the ancient principle the form of assigning a chose in
action is in the nature of a declaration of trust, and an
agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the
name of the assignor, in order to recover the possession. And therefore when in common acceptation a
debt or bond is said to be assigned over, it must be
sued in the original creditor's name; the person to
whom it is transferred being rather an attorney than
an assignee."
And it has often been arbitrarily stated that the law
does not recognize an assignment of a chose. This of course
is an absurdity if what is meant is that the law does not
20
recognize some rights in the assignee.
'Though no attempt is made to discuss these special choses, the development of the law with regard to assignment of ordinary choses is somewhat
analogous to the law relating to the assignment of an overdue negotiable
instrument. An excellent article thoroughly reviews these rights: Z.
Chafee, Jr., Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 Har. L. R. 1104. See also
Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95 (1878).
(Cooleys 4th ed.) 442. See also Story.
1 1 Blackstone's Commentaries.
Equity Jurisprudence (3rd ed.) Sec. 1040; Ames, op. cit. supra note 7, 6;
Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 253, 258. Cf. Restatement, Trusts, sec. 10.
1 ". . . . blind revolt at the assertion that choses are not transferrable
when in fact they are transferred." Williston, Is The Right of An Assignee
of a Chose In Action Legal or Equitable? (1916) 30 Har. L. R. 97, 107. "The
creation of an obligation is no part of the law of property; but the transfer
of such obligation when created is as much part of the law of property as
the transfer of a house or table." J. C. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities
(3rd ed.) 307 n, as quoted In Glenn, op. cit. supra note 10, 623 n.
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The question today is not whether a money debt call
be assigned (as used in the above sense) but rather, what
rights are acquired by the assignment.
At common law the obligee remained the obligee; at
law he could destroy the debt by granting a release or accepting payment. In equity the assignee's rights were
recognized and the obligor was restrained from relying
upon a release received after notice of the assignment,
or a payment made after notice. The right of the assignee
to collect was a power coupled with an interest and irrevocable; and soon the assignee could bring action in the name
of the assignor at law. Under these circumstances the rights
of the assignee have been called "equitable' .21
In modern times considerable pressure has developed
for additional protection of the assignee. The real-partyin-interest statutes are cited to show that the assignee has
more than a "mere equity" ;22 and articles have been written to show that there was no rule of the common law which
23
forbade assignment of legal title to a chose in action.
As a result statutes have been passed in some states which
are more than mere real-party-in-interest statutes and are
recognized as changing the nature of the assignee's rights
24
in substance.
Professor Williston disagrees with the tendency to define the rights of the assignee as legal. His views are set
" Shriner v. Lamborn use of Smith, 12 Md. 170 (1858) : Glenn, op. cit.
supra note 10, 625. See Owings & Piet v. Low, 5 G. & J. 134, 145 (1833).
2 W. W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 Har. L. R.
816; W. W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Willi.ston (1917) 30 Har. L. R. 449.
11A rather amusing discussion in the article by Bailey shows that in the
very early English history those who were maintained as the King's
bankers, were given certain special advantages in collection; and that the
use of the power of attorney in assignments was not because such obligations were unassignable, but to render to the assignee the same advantages
possessed by the assignor. The King's assent was necessary to the assignment. S. J. Bailey, Assignment of Debts in England From the Twelfth To
The Twentieth Century (1931) 47 Law Quart. Rev. 516. "The old doctrine
'caveat emptor' Is being modified by the change in social conditions to
'caveat dominus'." Huston, op. cit. supra note 4, 128. And see Holdsworth,
History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law (1920)
33 Har. L. R. 997; S. J. Bailey, Assignment of Debts in England From the
Twelfth to the Twentieth Century (1931) 47 Law Quart. Rev. 516; (1932)
48 Law Quart. Rev. 248, 547 (Parts II and III of the same article).
" See suipra note 22.
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out in answer to the arguments of Professor Cook.2 5 He
explains his recognition of the right of the assignee in law
courts but states that if we fail to remember that they are
derived in equity, substantial error may result. He therefore urges that the word "equitable" correctly describes
the assignee's rights.
He explains that he uses the word "equitable" in describing the nature of an assignee's rights to indicate that
the right was "originally enforcible in courts of chancery,
though no longer so, but retaining characteristics which distinguished the right in question when enforced in chan-

cery."

He explains :20

"It is in this sense that courts have used the word
in the scores of cases where the right of an assignee
of a chose in action has been called 'equitable' though
his action was necessarily brought in a law court. An
assignee has for centuries recovered in an action at
law; and for more than a century has rarely had occasion to ask the aid of a court of equity. He was not
allowed to proceed in equity in any ordinary case, and
without the aid of any statutes allowing equitable pleas,
and long before such statutes were passed, a court of
law afforded the assignee protection against defenses
of the debtor acquired after notice of the assignment."
He explains that the distinction is more than a mere
question of terminology. A legal title is distinguishable
from an equitable ownership in the method of approach
even though on occasion the same result is reached in the
case of an equitable ownership through the help of recording acts and other statutory devices.
"The law achieves the result by imposing limitations on a title which would otherwise be absolute.
Equity achieves the result by extending to others so
far as is conscientious
an obligation which is primarily
27
personal to one."
Williston, Is the Right of an A88ignee of a Chose In Action Legal or
Equitable? (1916) 30 Har. L. R. 97; Williston, The Word "Equitable" and
Its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action (1918) 31 Har. L. R.
822. See also Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.) Sec. 432.
" Op. cit. supra note 25, 31 Har. L. R. 822, 824.
Williston, op. cit. supra note 25, 30 Har. L. R. 97, 98-99.
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He then sums up his argument by distinguishing between
the alienation of property where ownership of the legal
title can be established according to rule; and the assignment of a contract obligation where "the boundaries of
contract obligation are fixed by the expressed mutual assent of the parties".
"The law may give defenses to contracts or limit
their operation for any reason of policy without regard
to expressions of assent by the parties, but if it imposes liability upon them different from that which
they have assumed in terms express, or fairly to be
implied, it is violating an established principle. And
this it certainly seems to do when it holds A liable to
C (an assignee) without his assent on a contractual
obligation to pay B (an assignor)." 2"
It will therefore be seen that though law courts have consistently recognized rights of the assignee since about the
end of the 18th century, the equitable ownership so involved
29
did not include a legal right to the claim itself.
Professor Williston objects to the designation of the
assignee's rights as legal more because he fears the result
of an over-statement than because he wishes to avoid the
results at present sought by his opponents. When an obligor enters into a contract essentially personal in nature,
it cannot be assigned at all.3 0 When a person enters into
an obligation to pay money he has inherent in his obligation the idea that under certain circumstances he will be
entitled to a defense. To deprive the obligor of the right
to assert that his obligation is personal, or to his defenses,
will impair his contract. Furthermore where right of set-off
is acquired prior to an assignment, it is only fair that the
assignor should be refused the right to deprive the obligor
of the set-off. Hence it is essential that in any assignment
Williston, op. cit. supra note 25, 31 Har. L. R. 822, 826.
-"Williston, op. cit. supra note 25, 30 Har. L. R. 97, 99.
Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md. 588,
128 Atl. 280 (1925). Circumstances have, of course, changed our conception of what obligations are so personal. In the days when an obligee could
imprison his debtor for a default, it was highly important for the debtor
to select carefully his obligee. See Bailey, op. cit. supra note 23, 47 Law
Quart. Rev. 516.
sOCrane
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the obligor's defenses should be preserved. The obligation
cannot, therefore, be treated like a chattel except under
certain circumstances when it is made negotiable, where
the obligor intends that he shall sacrifice defenses in the
hands of a bona fide purchaser for value.8 '
Mr. Williston further suggests that there would be another important result of recognizing a legal title in the
assignee to which he objects. It is universally recognized
that the assignee of a part of a claim cannot bring action
in his own name. 3 2 It is therefore undisputed that the partial assignee gets at most an equitable claim. If the subsequent total assignee of a claim were regarded as receiving a legal right his right would cut off that of the partial
assignee. Mr. Williston says that such a holding in the
case of a partial assignment with a contrary holding in the
case of two complete assignments would be a "monstrous

result' ,.33
The Doctrine of Dearle v. Hall
The tendency to protect and facilitate exchanges and
sales of choses has been reflected by the development of two
doctrines; one, by the extension of the rule of Dearle r.
Hall3 4 to choses in action; two, by the rule regarding latent
equities. There is very much the same element and background in both rules.
Dearle v. Hall was decided in 1828. It did not involve
the assignment of a chose in action but concerned the assignment by a cestui que trust, first, to one bona fide purchaser and then to a second bona fide purchaser. The second
purchaser notified the trustee of the assignment first and
it was held that he would prevail. The case has often been
discussed.35 The doctrine was based upon the idea that
though there can be no delivery of possession of a cestui's
11See also Maitland, op. cit. supra note 4, 147.
"Note the statutory exception in the case of mortgages, Md. Code, Art. 66,
Sec. 6.
Williston, op. cit. supra note 25, 30 Har. L. R. 97, 104.
"Supra note 2.
1I
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, sec. 194 et seq. (Bibliography at p. 554).
See Keasby, Notice ol Assignments in. Equity (1910) 19 Yale L. J. 258 u:
(1924) 24 Col. L. R. 501; (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 767. Maitland, Lectures on
Equity, 145.
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rights which are merely a claim against the trustee, the
least that the assignee can do to evidence to the world that
he is assignee is to report the transaction to the trustee.
If he does report, he protects himself from payment by
trustee to the cestui; which is more than the quiescent first
assignee is entitled to. So why not give him a preference ?"3
Many of the States in America adopted the rule but a
majority refused to follow it."' The American Law Institute refuses to follow the rule."' To those who did follow the rule the opportunity soon arrived to apply it to
the analogous case of the assignment of a chose in action.
The obligee took the place of the cestui; the obligor took
the place of the trustee. The analogy was carried out, and
the first assignee in point of time to give notice to the
obligor was protected.
A minority of the States applied the modified rule to
assignment of choses ;39 a majority refused to apply it, including the Federal Courts.4" The American Law Institute
follows the majority.4
The Latent Equity Doctrine
In 1817 Chancellor Kent invented the latent equity doctrine in his decision in Murray v. Lylburn.4 In that case
certain cestuis of a trust of land filed a bill against the trustee to enjoin him from disposing of property. While the
suit was pending, the trustee sold the land to M and took a
purchase money mortgage from M which he assigned to
A, a bona fide purchaser for value. The cestuis came against
A to upset the mortgage. The case was decided on the doctrine of lis pendens, but Kent stated that had the doctrine
not applied, he would have protected the bona fide purchasers as the equities asserted by the cestuis were latent
1 Maitland,

op. cit. supra note 4, 145.
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, see. 195; (note that Corpus Juria states
to the contrary in 65 C. J., sec. 303, p. 551.
I Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 163.
9Glenn, op. cit. supra note 10, 621, 626.
,0 Ibid, Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 68
L. Ed. 628, 44 S. Ct. 266 (1924).
" Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 173.
22 Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 441 (1817).
37

1
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and, therefore, did not bind the purchaser.
Kent reasons:

Chancellor

"The assignee'can always go to the debtor and ascertain what claims he may have against the bond, or
other chose in action, which he is about purchasing
from the obligee; but he may not be able with the utmost diligence, to ascertain the latent equity of some
third person against the obligee."
Latent equities have been defined by a writer in New
York as follows:
" 'Latent equities' embrace equities which are
secret and undisclosed at the time of the assignment of the chose, residing in some prior assignor, or44

in some third party, a stranger to the assignment."

However, the so-called "patent equities", not cut-off,
are sometimes far from obvious. An undiscovered equity
of defense of the obligor for fraud of the obligee is an example. Latent equities are sometimes spoken of as the
'equities of ownership" as distinguished from "equities
of defense ".

They arise out of claims to ownership of

the obligation rather than claims of defense against the
enforcement of the obligation. This latter definition is better than that of Lee.
When he made the above dictum, Chancellor Kent apparently was thinking along the lines that were considered
in Dearle v. Hall. Dearle v. Hall was decided, it will be
recalled, with regard to the assignment of a so-called equitable interest of a cestui in a trust, and the prior assignee
was cut off. While nominally based on a doctrine of estoppel there was in truth no real estoppel and the real
reason for the rule was to protect bona fide purchasers as
much as possible from a prior assignment. The latent
equity doctrine is almost an identical idea for cutting off
equities of third persons not prior purchasers, i. e. of subordinating a prior equity (latent) to a subsequent stronger
"Ibid, 442; Jones, Mortgages (8th ed.) sec. 1069.
"Lee, Latent Equities, 68 Albany L. J. 290, 291.

,Vanneman; Latent Equities in Ohio (1931) 5 Univ. of Cin. L. R. 185.
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equity not with the idea of true estoppel but rather as an
attempt to give the effect of a "legal title" to this sort of
assignment very much like what Dean Ames suggested.
It is noticeable that the latent equity doctrine does not
affect the obligation of the obligor of the chose and, therefore, Mr. Williston's main objection regarding the impairment of contracts is avoided. The application of the doctrine does not require the recognition of a "legal title" in
the assignee but depends upon the establishment of an
hierarchy of equities to reach a result analogous to the
legal title result through equitable means. It is further
noticeable that though the device is intended to reach a
result in the case of choses in action, the idea of establishing an hierarchy of equities could very well be applied in
the case of things other than choses in action; as for instance, equitable ownership in chattels. So it might be
urged that the trustee of an equity of redemption could
convey a good equitable title to a bona fide purchaser as
against his cestui. This comment is made to show that the
device, intended to avoid one difficulty, creates a method for
reaching the general result Ames suggested in his article
on bona fide purchases mentioned above.
The doctrine of latent equities has been criticized as
unnecessary deprivation of the prior claimants' rights.";
It has been adopted in a number of States but not by the
weight of authority." It is interesting to note that the doctrine (devised by Chancellor Kent of New York) was thereafter repudiated in New York.4 The doctrine is, however,
accepted by the American Law Institute, which protects
the assignee for value even in the case where the obligation is held in trust for a cestui 9
With this preliminary, a warning should be sounded
against the use of the expression "latent equities" with
too much reliance on the word "latent". As has been
Walsh, Mortgages, 265.
W8
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, sec. 883; Walsh, Mortgages, see. 62; note
(1918) 32 Har. L. R. 431; Glenn, op. cit. supra note 10, 621, 626; (contra)
Jones, Mortgages (8th ed.) sec. 1069.
"1Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535 (1860) ; Walsh, Mortgages, sec. 62.
"0Restatement, Contracts, see. 174; Note (1918) 32 Har. L. R. 431.
47
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seen, the doctrine is a qualification of the equity doctrine
which, unless some good reason is shown, protects a prior
equity. Where a chose-or an equitable interest is conveyed
first to one and then to another purchaser, the second purchaser is just as much handicapped in determining the existence of the first purchaser's rights as he would be in
determining whether some prior assignor has been defrauded; yet in the former case he will some times not be
protected even where the latent equity doctrine is in force5 0
So, if A defrauds an obligee, E, into assigning a debt to
himself and then A assigns to B, a bona fide purchaser,
E cannot rescind under the latent equities doctrine; but if
E, instead of being defrauded, assigns the obligation to A,
and then assigns it to B, A is protected. Such a result is
not explainable if the reasoning advanced to justify the
rule of latent equities is that which was given by Chancellor Kent. Both equities are latent so far as B is concerned.
But if we approach the matter in a different light the
distinction is easier. Professor Ames' argument for protection of a bona fide purchaser of an equity was to put it
on a parity with conveyance of a legal title. If E, owner of
a chattel, is defrauded into conveying legal title to A who
conveys to B, a bona fide purchaser, B is protected from
E's equity of rescission; but if E conveys legal title to A,
and then conveys to B, A is protected. 1 So that if we approach the situation in the same way that Ames did, we
would not protect the second assignee from a prior assignment.
Perhaps the explanation of the difficulty is that courts,
feeling the pressure about them to recognize that a chose
is assignable, were confronted with the usual difficulty in
the case of judicial legislation. They wished to find a way
to reach Ames' conclusion, yet could not do so without excuse. The latent equity doctrine, while a convenient excuse
for doing so in the cases originally coming before the
court, accomplished too much; and so has been qualified in
cases where the result went too far.
o Note (1911) 24 Har. L. Rev. 490.
Ames, op. cit. supra note 7, 9.

LATENT EQUITIES
If we take the American Law Institute as a guide to
what may result from the general scramble, we see
(1)

equity doctrine
It reaches the results of the latent
52
in case of assignments of choses.

(2)

It discards the rule of Dearle v. Hall."

(3)

Where an obligee or a cestui assigns his interest to first one and then another bona fide purchaser, it protects the former. 4
THE SITUATION IN MARYLAND

In Maryland an equitable interest in a chattel, though
In the case of
assignable, is subject to prior equities.2
choses in action non-personal obligations can, of course, be
assigned. It is perfectly clear, however, that at our common law a non-negotiable chose in action could not be assigned "at law". 5 Suit had to be brought in the name of
the assignor, and the assignee's relief was addressed to
the law court to exercise its power to give equitable relief
at law. So, where the assignee of a penalty brought suit
in the name of the obligee (assignor) and after the Statute of Limitations had run the obligee dismissed the action,
the assignee's petition for reinstatement was denied, because equity does not enforce a penalty. 7
The Maryland Statute, applicable to assignment of a
limited class of unsecured choses only, changed the procedure.
"The assignee of any judgment bond, specialty, or
other chose in action for the payment of money, or any
legacy or distributive share of the estate of a deceased
person bona fide entitled thereto by assignment in writing signed by the person authorized to make the same,
may, by virtue of such assignment, maintain an action
or issue an execution in his own name against the
'$Restatement, Contracts, sec. 174.
"sRestatement, Contracts, see. 173.
" Ibid; Restatement, Trusts, sec. 163.
"Pen Mar Co. v. Ashman, 152 Md. 273, 279, 136 Atl. 640 (1927) ; Miller
v. Hlrschmann, - Md. -, 183 Atl. 259 (1936).
Shriner v. Lamborn, use of Smith, 12 Md. 170 (1858).
'Andrews & Green v. Central Bank, 77 Md. 21, 25 Atl. 915 (1893).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
debtor therein named, in the same manner as the assignor might have done before the assignment:" 8
This provision is almost identical with the original statute passed in 182951 the preamble of which gave as the reason for the statute:
"Whereas equitable assignees have frequently sustained injuries and loss, by the death of the assignor
or legal plaintiff. .. ."
The Court of Appeals in passing on this section has
said:
"The preamble to the Act as well as the enacting
clause shews that the design of the Legislature was
no further to extend the powers, or enlarge the rights
of the assignee, than to enable him to sue in his own
name. . . . We think, therefore, that this Act of Assembly does not impair or change the rights, either
legal or equitable, of the obligor or debtor, whether
the suit be instituted in the name of the assignor or
assignee. '"6
"Before the Act of 1829, Ch. 51, the bona fide assignee of a chose in action, was considered as having peculiarly an equitable remedy, and certainly that
statute enlarges his powers." 1
"That Act only enables the assignee to sue in his
own name. It does not alter the nature of the assign-

ment. ',62

The statute should be regarded therefore as changing procedural rights but not as changing rights of substance of
the assignee. It does not go so far as some statutes and
still comes within the definition by Mr. Williston of an
3
equitable right enforceable at law.1
.It is also clear that despite this statute, equities of defense (or so-called "patent equities") can be asserted
against any assignee whether a bona fide purchaser or not:
"Any defendant may make the same legal or equitable defenses as might or could have been had and
maintained against the assignor at the time of such
"Md. Code, Art. 8, sec. 1. (Italics supplied.)
Md. Acts 1829, Ch. 51.
' Harwood et al. v. Jones, 10 G. & J. 404, 420 (1839).
Schaferman v. O'Brien, 28 Md. 565, 574 (1868).
2Cox
v. Sprigg, 6 Md. 274, 286 (1854).
1 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) Sees. 446A, 447.
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assignment and before notice thereof, and to the same
extent. "64
These include rights of recoupment undiscovered at the
time of assignment." The only apparent way that a debtor
can be deprived of these defenses is by an estoppel which
66
the courts do not seem anxious to extend.
Latent Equities in Maryland
In Economy Savings Bank v. Gordon, 7 a bill was
brought by creditors of M to cancel a mortgage given by
M to E and thereafter assigned by E to a bona fide purchaser for value. It was admitted that the conveyance to
E could have been upset, but the court stated that the equity
of creditors of M was latent and that, therefore, the bona
fide purchaser was protected. Had the equity which had been
assigned been an equitable interest in a chattel, the bona
fide purchaser would have probably failed. The application of the latent equities doctrine saved the bona fide purchaser just as it would have saved the bona fide purchaser
of the legal title of a chattel.6 s
Wicklein v. Kidd,6" was a case where a prior grantor
filed a bill against a mortgagee alleging that her grant to
the mortgagor had been obtained by fraud. The mortgagee
was declared a bona fide purchaser and was protected. The
court distinguishes7 ° this case from where a mortgagor
claims that a mortgage is invalid because of fraud of the
mortgagee and is protected against a bona fide purchaser.
The court in the Gordon Case71 makes a comment which
might indicate that a distinction could be drawn between

"Md.

Code, Art. 8, Sec. 3; National Bank v. Anderson, 152 Md. 641, 137
Atl. 367 (1927) ; Carney v. Maas, 166 Md. 249, 170 Atl. 781 (1934).
Schenuit v. Finance Corp., 148 Md. 403, 415, 130 Ati. 331 (1925);
Hagerstown Bank & Trust Co. v. College of St. James, 167 Md. 646, 176 Atl.
276 (1935).
"Blum v. Apitz, 149 Md. 91, 131 Atl. 35 (1925). Cf. Hunter v. Chase, 144
Md. 13, 123 Ati. 393 (1923). While the so-called estoppel certificate obtained by a transferee from a mortgagor debtor is a common-place in New
York, it is not believed to be in general use here.
07 90 Md. 486, 45 Atl. 176 (1900).
11See also Farmers' Bank of Va., etc., v. Brooke, Trustee, etc., 40 Md. 249
(1874) ; but cf. Byles v. Tome, 39 Md. 461 (1874).
149 Md. 412, 131 Atl. 780 (1926).
,0Ibid, 421.
71 Supra note 67.
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assignment of a debt together with legal title to a mortgage which is security and assignment of the debt alone.7"
It could very well be argued that the legal title to the security gave the purchaser a better right than the equitable ownership of the debt.
Such distinction has not generally been recognized in
Maryland. In People's Banking Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. 73 an attempt was made by the People's Banking
Co. to regain possession of certain mortgages transferred
by it to the Central Trust Company and by that company
to the defendant surety company. It was alleged that the
Trust Co. had obtained a transfer of these mortgages with
the other assets of the Bank in a purchase induced by
fraud. The Surety Company defended on the ground that
it had accepted the transfer of the mortgages to it in good
faith in exchange for its continuance on certain depository bonds of the Trust Company and that it was therefore
not subject to the equity of rescission which might have
been asserted against the Trust Company. The defense was
allowed and the Surety Company kept the mortgages.
It is noticeable that here again the legal title of the
mortgage was transferred along with the debt. The case
is, however, treated as one involving the transfer of a
non-negotiable chose and the dissenting opinion written by
Parke, J., expressly states that the writer joins with the
majority in deciding that the bona fide purchase of a nonnegotiable chose will cut off latent equities.74 Here then
there is an apparent direct approval of the latent equity
doctrine.
The majority opinion is not, however, clear on this subject. The court seemed to base its reasoning on a sort of
estoppel saying:
"... while the general rule is that a vendee acquires
no better title than his vendor, it is subject to an exception, quite as well established as the rule itself, that,
where the true owner puts it in the power of another
to deal with property as though it were his own, and
2
Tbid, 502.
7'165 Md. 657, 170 AtI. 544 (1933).
SIbid, 684, 685.
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that person transfers it to one who purchases it in
good faith, for value, and without notice or knowledge
of any infirmity in the title of his vendor, the true
owner will be estopped from asserting his title against
such purchaser. "7 5
Certainly no such broad rule can be applied to assignments of choses in action; and the mere placing of apparent
ownership of a mortgage in another is usually not ground
for an estoppel. 76 In view of the confusion which reference to "estoppels" of this sort create it is fortunate that
the majority opinion was clarified by that of the minority.
It seems safe to conclude that the latent equity doctrine is
law in Maryland whether or not the purchaser obtains legal
title to security for the debt with the assignment.
Despite the People's Banking Company Case, it is interesting to note that the court restricted the application
of the doctrine in another recent case. In Hagerstown
Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. College of St. James" M mortgaged certain property to the Bank which in turn made
a recorded assignment to X. An examination of the record shows that the mortgage was overdue when assigned
to X, though this fact is not mentioned in the opinion. Subsequently X reconveyed the mortgage to the Bank. None
of the conveyances indicated that the mortgage was held
in trust. The mortgagor which had in the meanwhile maintained a large deposit in the mortgagee Bank did not withdraw its funds because it relied upon a set-off, in the event
of trouble, against the mortgage debt. The Bank became
insolvent and it was admitted that ordinarily a set-off
would have been permitted. 7 The Bank set up that the
reconveyance from X to itself was to it as trustee and that
the purchase was made with funds of a trust estate. None
of this was shown in the record title. The court held that
the cestui's interest in the mortgage debt would prevent
the mortgagor from obtaining a set-off.
7

5 Ibid, 664.
16Whistler v. Hanna, 152 Md. 597, 137 Atl. 276 (1927) ; Carney v. Maas,
166 Md. 249, 170 AtI. 781 (1934) ; National Bank v. Anderson, 152 Md. 641,
137 AtI. 367 (1927).
"7167 Md. 646, 176 Atl. 276 (1934).
Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 16.
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Assuming that the right of set-off was a substantial
right in the nature of an equitable right, it would seem
that M's continuation of his deposit in reliance of his right
of set-off was a change of position sufficient to defeat the
cestui and should have cut off the cestui's interest so that
the set-off should have been permitted under the latent
equity doctrine. The court, however, refused to apply the
doctrine. It is noticeable that the American Law Institute,
which has adopted the latent equity doctrine7 9 would probably have recognized the right of set-off even had the mortgage not been due at the time of the assignment to X.8 °
The Effect of Dearle v. Hall in Maryland
The leading case regarding the adoption of the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall in Maryland is Lambert v. Morgan."'
There a testator left real estate to be sold by T, trustee,
and the income paid to C for life. Before the sale of the
property by T, C mortgaged his interest to six groups of
persons one after the other and each of them gave value.
The question of priority of the various assignments came
up. The court quoted Dearle v. Hall as follows:
" 'In cases like the present the act of giving the
trustee notice is, in a certain degree, taking possession
of the fund; it is going as far toward equitable possession as it is possible to go, for, after notice given,
the trustee of the fund becomes a trustee for the assignee who has given him notice.' "8'
The court then cites Story on Equity and quotes from a
passage of Story having to do with the assignment of
choses in action. (Story regarded the assignor as a trustee):
"In order to perfect his title against the debtor it
is indispensible that the assignee should immediately
give notice of an assignment to the debtor, for otherwise, a priority of right may be obtained by a subsequent assignee, or the debt may be discharged by a
payment to the assignor before such notice." 8
Restatement, Contracts, See. 174.
"Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 167, and Restatement, Trusts, 'See. 323.
,1110 Md. 1, 72 At. 407 (1909).
82Ibid, 26.
a Ibid, 26, 27.
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The court thereupon decided that the first mortgagee to
give notice took precedence over prior mortgagees of the
cestui's interest.
Aside from the adoption of the rule of Dearle v. Hall
the case is interesting for two reasons; first, the court cites
a passage from Story relating to assignments of choses in
action which paved the way for application of the rule
of Dearle v. Hall in the case of such assignments; second,
the passage of Story cited speaks of the perfection of a
"title" to a chose against the debtor. With regard to this
second statement it is obvious that Story could not have
meant that the assignee acquired a legal obligation running to himself unless not only notice was given to the
debtor, but also the debtor consented to substitute the assignee as his obligee, i. e. a novation. Story must have
been using the word "title" in the sense of equitable ownership; although we see in later Maryland cases where
the court in commenting upon the assignment of a chose
in action not yet due and therefore, in its mind, not as
complete as an irrevocable assignment of a chose in action which has become due, as an assignment "equitable
in nature". This indicates a tendency of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to speak of complete assignments in the
sense of the passage of a legal title to the assignment, and of
those incomplete or defective in the sense of passage of
an equitable ownership, equivalent to an equitable interest in an imperfect conveyance of a chattel. The confusion
so caused will be discussed later.
The citation from Dearie v. Hall regarding possession
would have indicated that the reasoning underlying the
postponement of the assignee's interest was analogous to
a failure to deliver a chattel, i. e. based not on estoppel
so much as a defect in title of the transferee."" This idea
of incomplete transfer, however, was not to prove the true
basis of the rule. In McDowell, Pyle & Company v. Hop8 Cf. the statement of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
famous case of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353, 363, 69 L. Ed. 991, 45
S. Ct. 566 (1925), holding an assignment defective "not upon seeming ownership (in the assignor) because of possession retained, but upon a lack of
ownership (in the assignee) because of dominion reserved".
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field,"5 a contractor assigned existing accounts to E to secure an advance of money by E. A subsequent creditor
then issued a non-resident attachment against one of the
accounts and recovered judgment of condemnation before
notice was given by E to the debtor of his assignment. It
was stated by the court that E had refrained from giving
notice "in deference to the assignor'
Under these circumstances it was naturally argued by
the attaching creditor that E's assignment Was incomplete;
that though the attaching creditor admittedly got no better title to the property than M possessed, and was not entitled to rely on an estoppel, nevertheless as E never got
any interest in the chose, M retained an attachable interest and, therefore, his attachment should be good.8 7 The
court refused to recognize the attaching creditor's contention and held that sufficient interest passed to E to give
him precedence over the attaching creditor despite the fact
that notice had not been given to the debtor.
In reaching this conclusion the court brought the case
into close line with the authority relating to the equitable mortgage of chattels to E, who has for some reason or
other failed to perfect his legal title. In these cases the
putative mortgagee has been protected against a subsequent attaching creditor.
The case of Lambert v. Morgan establishes the doctrine
of Dearle v. Hall in Maryland with respect to assignment
of a cestui 's interest in a trust; it impliedly also extends the
doctrine to assignments of choses in action. No case, however, has been discovered in Maryland which has expressly
passed on the point where assignment of a chose in action
88
is involved and it should be noted that in an earlier case
the first of two assignees of a chose was protected without
mention of who was first to give notice to the obligor or the
effect of such a notice. If the doctrine is in force with
148 Md. 84, 128 Ati. 742 (1925).
Ibid, 89.
"Cf. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Thomas J. Carson & Co., 12 Md. 54 (1858)
(mere order for payment "when in funds" from a certain source, does not
defeat attaching creditor).
8 Byles v. Tome, supra note 68.
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respect to assignments of choses in action, which is assumed, the apparent effect of the Hopfield case 9 is to limit
the doctrine to one of estoppel against the assertion of a
defective title by an assignee which will be available only
to certain classes of persons; and to discard the theory that
it is a rule of conveyancing which would leave sufficient
interest in the assignor to be reached on attachment by the
assignor's creditor.
The conclusion that Dearle v. Hall will be applied to
assignments of choses in action in Maryland is however
again complicated by an apparent distinction made by the
court between a partial assignment and the total assignment of a chose in action.
"Even if the garnishee had been a debtor instead
of a trustee bound by the duties of an active trust, and
had not, in fact, accepted the partial assignments, prior
notice to the garnishee would have made the assignments operate as equitable assignments between the
owner and the assignees and, so, good as against subsequent attaching creditors of the assignor. The reason for this is that the attaching creditor can subject
to his attachment only the interest of the attachment
debtor at the time of the attachment and arising before
the trial. It follows that a bona fide partial assignment
or other transfer by the debtor before the laying of
the attachment has priority, although the assignment
or other transfer be equitable instead of good at law."90
The statement is dictum but in view of the scarcity of cases
it is possible that it might lead to adoption, at least in the
case of a partial assignment, of a contrary result from
the Hopfield Case (where no notice prior to the attachment was given).
In the Pen Mar Case a trustee was appointed to hold
certain funds, advanced by a mortgagee, to be paid to the
mortgagor as a building covered by the mortgage progressed. The mortgagor made assignments of certain funds
which had not yet come due under the trust to secure an
advance by A. A gave notice to the trustee. A creditor
Supra note 85.
0Pen Mar Co. v. Ashman, supra note 55.
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then laid an attachment in the trustee's hands. The court
first discussed the difference between the assignmeni of
an equitable interest in a chattel and the assignment of a
portion of an interest of an obligee in a chose in action. It
treated the case as though it were the case of a cestui
assigning an equitable property interest (in a chattel) and
based its decision in favor of the assignee on that ground.
It then went on to suppose that the assignment was the
assignment of a chose. Under this assumption it said that
the assignment was not a good "legal assignment" because
it was for only part of the debt, but that it at least should
be regarded as an "equitable assignment" good against
attaching creditors.
Here again we see the confusion evident in the court's
mind with respect to the effect of an assignment and the
use of the adjective "legal" to define an assignment of the
whole chose, which is not defective; and "equitable" to
define a defective or partial assignment. Can it be that
the court would distinguish the Hopfield case on this
ground, calling the total assignment in that case a legal
assignment though the assignee had not given notice to
the debtor ? And if so could a garnishing creditor postpone
a prior equitable assignee who has failed to give notice?
In Seymour v. Finance & Guaranty Co." we have another case where the Court speaks of an equitable title
which is apparently regarded to some extent as subordinate to the ordinary interest acquired in an assignment.
In that case H, a contractor, borrowed money from the F.
& G. Co. under an agreement by which he was to sell them
accounts which he represented to be "existing, undisputed,
liquidated claims which were due or to become due on the
dates set forth". After the assignment of a number of
these claims, H was on the point of defaulting when a creditors' committee was appointed which obtained an assignment from H of his rights under the contract and the creditors' committee completed the work at a loss. It turned
out that the assignments from H were not of liquidated
" 155

Md. 514, 531, 142 Ati. 710 (1928).
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sums of money then due but rather of anticipated payments
of money to be earned. The committee knew of the terms
of this assignment. It was held that "the debt had no actual existence" because it was not then earned, but it "did
have a potential existence" so that it could have been assigned; that though the rights of the assignee were not
eqivalent to those of a completed assignment nevertheless
"equity will treat the assignment as an assignment pro
tanto of the fund, and by force thereof vests the equitable
title to the money in the assignee". The court thereupon
held that H having assigned his contract to E, gave E a
legal claim against the committee for moneys earned in the
performance of the work by H under the supervision of
the creditors' committee though earned by reason of their
advance of additional moneys.2
From what has been said, it is evident
that though Dearle
v. Hall is probably law in Maryland both with respect to
assignments of the interest of a cestui que trust and of an
ordinary chose in action, the effect of the rule is still in
some doubt. Lambert v. Morgan has not often been cited
on this point and considerable remains to be said by the
Court of Appeals. The ever present confusion resulting
from the casual use of the word "equitable" can be expected to increase the difficulty both to the court in deciding the cases and to practitioners in interpreting its
93
opinions.
" The case is also interesting as a warning to persons dealing with creditors' committees to be careful to arrange a technical default on the part
of the assigning debtor before completing performance of a contract in
order to protect themselves from prior assignees of the debtor. See also
Hohman v. Orem, -

Md. -,

182 Atl. 587 (1936).

One additional question should be mentioned which remains undecided
in Maryland. Is the doctrine tabula in naufragio going to be extended to
the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall? Will a bona fide purchaser for value be in
a worse position if he receives notice of the prior assignment before he
notifies the trustee? The doctrine of tabula in nautragio has been criticized and is not generally recognized in this country; Huston, op. cit. supra
note 4, 129; Bogert, op. cit. supra note 7, see. 886; Maitland, op. cit. supra
note 4, 135; but we have another case of a similar right where the bona fide
purchaser of legal title to land who first records his instrument is protected.
Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 16. On principle there seems little reason to qualify
the rule of Dearle v. Hall by refusing to protect a bona fide subsequent
assignee who has given value whether or not he receives notice of a prior
assignment before he himself notifies the obligor.
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Comparison of the Two Doctrines
Before closing the discussion of the latent equity doctrine in Maryland it is relevant to compare it with the
rule of Dearle v. Hall. While historically the two doctrines
are separate, so that at the present time Dearle v. Hall is
not accepted but the latent equity doctrine is accepted by
the American Law Institute, it would seem that fundamentally the two doctrines are based on much the same reasoning-the recognition of a demand for greater marketability. The prior unannounced assignment of a chose to
a person who does not trouble to notify the trustee or
debtor seems to be merely a variety of latent equity. While
it is not necessary to express any opinion as to the advisability of extending the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall, the
comparison of the two doctrines and the recognition of
their similarity should help in the development of the law.
Conclusive Presumption of Title Under Article 66,
Section 25
The law relating to assignments is sufficiently confused
in Maryland without considering the effect of the statute
relating to mortgage debts, which reads in part:
"The title to all . . . debts hereafter contracted,
secured by mortgage or deeds in the nature of a mortgage, shall ... be conclusively presumed to be vested
in the person ... holding the record title to such mortgage or deed in the nature of a mortgage." 94
The purpose of the statute has been explained as follows:
"The object of the Act was to avoid the complications that often arose by reason of the fact that the
release of a mortgage by the mortgagee was not valid,
unless he also owned the evidences of debt secured
by it, and hence it often left the titles to mortgaged
property involved, as the ownership of the evidences
not necessarily, or usually, a matter of
of debt was
95
record. "
Md. Code, Art. 66, Sec. 25
9Dickey v. Pocomoke City Bank, 89 Md. 280, 296, 43 At. 33 (1899).
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Despite the wording of the statute, it has been recognized that an equitable interest does pass to an assignee
though the assignment is not recorded.
"The legal title to the mortgage debt, no matter
how evidenced, is conclusively presumed to be in the
party holding the record title to the mortgage deed.
. . . The equitable title to the mortgage indebtedness
may, however, be in an assignee under an assignment
not of record ....,990
The statute has been stated to have the effect of protecting the subsequent bona fide assignee for value of a
mortgage (who records) against prior unrecorded assignments.9 7 A combination of Art. 21 sec. 16 (giving priority
to the first bona fide purchaser for value who records) and
Art. 66 sec. 25 would seem to protect the first person to
record as between two assignees. But sec. 16 applies only
to the conveyances of "lands or chattels real". Perhaps
sec. 25, alone, will accomplish the result for other cases,
particularly if the second assignment is recorded without
notice of prior assignments.
Sec. 25 seems to apply to second and equitable mortgages as well as first mortgages; and to partial assignments as well as full assignments of the debt.9 8 It will
probably not be construed to give persons not assignees
of the mortgage any rights.9 9 While a considerable group
of choses in action are removed by this section from the
discussion in this paper, a large class are also apparently
added. The statute probably renders all mortgage notes
non-negotiable."' It perhaps renders all bonds secured by
mortgage deeds of trust non-negotiable so that a purchase
from a thief would not be protected;101 and it is hard to
see how the assignee of such a bond can get more than the
so-called "equitable interest" to the chose if the statute
is interpreted literally.
"Baltimore v. Harper (dissenting opinion) 148 Md. 234, 241, 129 At.
641 (1925); Re Bowling Const. Corp. (U. S. D. C. Md.) 19 F. (2d) 604
(1927); Aff. Sapero v. Nieswender (CCA-4) 23 F. (2d) 403 (1928).
97National Bank v. Schlosser, 152 Md. 609, 614, 137 Atl. 351 (1927) ; Morrow v. Stanley, 119 Md. 590, 599, 87 Ati. 484 (1913).
1 National Bank v. Schlosser, supra.
9 Supra note 77.
11Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 350, 129 Atl. 506 (1925).
101Cf. Baltimore v. Harper (dissenting opinion), supra note 96.
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CONCLUSION

The object of this paper has been to show that there
is a strong modern tendency to qualify the accepted general rule of equity that a bona fide purchaser of equitable
rights is not protected from prior equities. It has been
shown that though the assignment of a chose in action is
regarded as creating nothing but an equitable interest in
the assignee nevertheless he will in two important instances be protected: One, in cases where the assignor has
already assigned to another assignee for value, where the
second assignee first gives notice to the obligor (the rule
.of Dearle v. Hall); and two, in cases where the bona fide
purchaser of a chose in action is protected from pre-existing latent equities set up against his claim of ownership.
The application of the doctrine extending (in a limited
manner) the bona fide purchaser rule to the purchase of
equitable interests in the case of choses in action seems to
blaze the trail for a similar treatment with respect to the
bona fide purchase of other equitable interests (already to
some extent opened by the adoption of the doctrine of
Dearle v. Hall). For instance, if latent equities attaching
to a chose can be cut off on the ground that the equity is
not as strong an equity of ownership as the claim of a
subsequent bona fide purchaser, why cannot the same reasoning apply to the situation where a trustee of an equitable interest conveys the interest to a bona fide purchaser
in fraud of his cestui ? It would seem that every substantial
reason for applying the bona fide purchaser rule in one case
would apply in the other, yet courts have been reluctant to
respond to the pressure for extension of the rule and only a
small minority recognize it. 10 2 It is interesting to note, however, that the American Law Institute recognizes the right
of a bona fide purchaser of an equitable interest in such
103
a case, where the transaction has been consumated.
No attempt has been made in this discussion to consider
10Bogert,

op. elt. supra note 7, Sec. 885, pp. 2561-2568.
10 Restatement, Trusts, Sees. 284, 285, 286.
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the assignment of future accounts. 10 4 At common law it
was impossible to give to another an assignment, even in
the form of a power to collect, of a chose in action which
did not exist, as it was regarded as against the public in05
terest to permit a man to so encumber his future assets."
Persons engaged in commercial enterprises, as for instance
the retail sale of goods, often find it necessary to borrow
money and to assign accounts not in existence to the lender.
Pressure for recognition for such assignments has been
great and without much discussion they have been recognized as valid in many States. Courts have reached this
conclusion by comparing an assignment of an after acquired chose in action to the assignment of an after acquired chattel and have built up a so-called "equitable title"
analogous to the equitable interest recognized in many
States in the case of assignments of after acquired chattels. Such assignments of after acquired choses are recognized by the Federal Courts as valid under Maryland
law. The restrictions concerning such assignments and the
rules which must be followed to make a valid assignment
are sufficiently complicated to make the basis for another
paper. Suffice to say that the Court of Appeals of Maryland seems in the humor to recognize two sorts of interests in the case of assignments of choses in action; one
a so-called "legal" interest, the other a so-called "equitable" interest; and the assignment of an after acquired
chose perhaps may take the same position as the equitable
ownership recognized in the case of the mortgage of an
after acquired chattel and so be subject to claims of preexisting equities even though they be latent.
The following summarizes what seems to be the present state of the Maryland law:
1. The Maryland assignment statute, Article 8 section
1, does not change the nature of an assignment from
one "equitable" in nature.
10

'Lauchheimer, Problem8 in Modern CollateraW Banking (1926) 26 Col.
L. R. 129. Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 639.
Seymour v. Finance & Guaranty Co., 155 Md. 514, 531, 142 Ati. 710
(1928) ; Cf. Restatement, Contracts, Sees. 154, 166. See Hamilton, In Re
The Small Debtor (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 473.
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2. Defenses of the obligor may be asserted against
subsequent assignees at least if they arise out of
the contract itself.
3. A right of set-off against the obligee can be cut off
by a hidden equity, and apparently even a right of
set-off on a matured claim can be cut off by assignment.
4. Latent equities are cut off by a bona fide purchase
of the chose, at least where the chose is an obligation within the meaning of Code Art. 8 sec. 1.
5. In the case of two successive assignments by an
obligee the first gets at least an equitable interest
which can be cut off by a bona fide purchaser (under Dearle v. Hall) if the second assignee gives
notice first.
6. The doctrine tabula in naufragiohas apparently not
yet been applied in Maryland to the assignment of
a chose.
7. The court is fast coming to the position in its dicta
regarding assignments of the ':legal title" to a
chose where the dicta will become law and assignment of choses will then be treated like assignments
of chattels; and there will be a distinction between
"legal title" and "equitable title" under assignments.
8. This will probably result in giving precedence to
"legal title" under an assignment over a prior
"equitable assignment"; the result which Williston calls "monstrous".
9. This will probably have its effect on assignments
of after acquired choses because of the analogy to
assignments of after acquired chattels.
10. The law is radically changed with regard to debts
secured by mortgages.
The tendency in Maryland has been to draw a stronger
and stronger analogy to the assignment of a chose and the
conveyance of legal title of a chattel. As we have seen, the
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analogy between the assignment of a chose and the conveyance of an equitable interest in a chattel is somewhat
close. On the other hand, if the court making this analogy
later goes further to hold that a completed assignment
within the terms of Code Art. 8 sec. 1 passes "legal title"
analogous to that of the legal title passed in the case of
a perfect conveyance of a chattel, we can anticipate confusion. The dicta in the cases cited above indicate that the
court is not clear as to the effect of such an assignment of
a chose; and that when a case involving the question comes
before it, it may very well fall into the errors suggested
as possible by Mr. Williston (see articles quoted above).
It will, for instance, be interesting to see whether the bona
fide purchaser of an assignment within the terms of Md.
Code, Article 8, sec. 1 will be given preference over a prior
partial assignee of the same debt, on analogy to the superiority of the bona fide purchaser of the legal title of a chattel over a prior equitable title.
The actual results accomplished so far in the Maryland
law of assignment seem desirable. They recognize a qualification of the rule of equity to the extent of adopting both
the latent equity doctrine and the doctrine of Dearle v. Hall.
These two doctrines have been adopted in the manner customarily used by a court which is given old legal ideas to
adapt to new situations. The changes have been gradual
and made to fit the particular case. The real difficulty is
that we have attempted to fit the law of assignment of
choses in action into the law constructed for assignments
of chattels. We have recognized only a legal title or an
equitable right with certain characteristics surrounding
each. To attempt to fit the assignment of a non-negotiable
chose in either category is to put a square peg into a
round hole.
Here we see the true good accomplished by the American Law Institute in its Restatement which presents a
compact picture available to judges who are moulding the
law in individual cases. The Restatement shows a very
radical departure from the older ideas of assignment yet
does so according to a set plan with a wary eye for pos-
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sible confusion. Instead of being dependent upon working
out the assignee's right on theories of equitable procedure
adopted for chattels, with modifications of that procedure,
like the latent equity doctrine, the Restatement has set
forth rules to show the right of the assignee which are
stated in a way to indicate that it is independent of the
rules concerning either legal title or equitable ownership
of chattels. The obligation of the obligor is kept intact,
yet assignees of even a part of the obligation are given
rights which comply with modern demands for easy disposal of this valuable property.
We must remember that there is more to the problem
than a recognition that the obligor's duty under a contract
cannot be put into set rules of property in the same manner in which we can define ownership of a chattel. We must
go further and recall that the ownership of a chattel as a
practical matter is different from the ownership of the
chose. The chattel is a thing which people can see and
touch and deliver; on possession of which creditors, at
least to some extent, can rely; and which before it becomes
the property of another must be conveyed either by delivery or by some other event which can be verified. Set
rules have grown up concerning conveyance of title and
recording acts have been devised to protect creditors. Such
things do not usually exist in the assignment of a chose except in the case where it is represented by an instrument
which can be delivered and which can represent title (insurance policies, notes, etc.). The legal results of a conveyance should, therefore, be treated as distinct.
We could perhaps find that the rules surrounding ordinary equitable ownership are better applied than the
harsher rules concerning legal title. So we might conclude
that a prior equity in a chose should not be cut off though
we would cut off a somewhat similar equity, upon conveyance of the legal title of a chattel.
This is a matter of policy. It will be unfortunate if we
wander into an inadvertent determination of the policy
involved by a confusion of terms or by misleading analogies.

